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Rodrigo Parra Sandoval* 
The exhaustion of the modernization model, the 
acute crisis affecting the family and the 
shortcomings of political and educational 
institutions place Colombian young people in a state 
of isolation characterized, in the author's view, by 
few opportunities of political participation, a future 
of unemployment or underemployment, poor-
quality education which inspires no enthusiasm and 
guarantees neither employment or social mobility, 
and a society without a clear model of a future with a 
place in it for young people. Young people are also 
faced with a chaos of values generated not only by the 
very rapid succession of three social situations (rural 
society, modern society and model-less society) but 
also by the emergence of forms of organization 
connected with that succession, such as the black 
economy, the economic organization of drug-
traffiking or dependence on drugs, corruption in the 
world of finance and administration, and the 
consumerist visions offered by the mass 
communication media. 
This produces a feeling of economic and cultural 
exclusion, 3 devaluation of the concept of youth 
derived from the modernization model, and a 
dangerous proximity to a situation of social 
breakdown. The fact that these circumstances make 
it difficult to conceive of a personal or group future 
and plan a career is what constitutes the missing 
future of today's youth, 
The author analyses these general features in 
greater detail in three areas: work, political 
participation and migration. 
•With the collaboration of BernardoJaramillo. The 
author is a consultant to i-CLAC's Social Development 
Division. This is a summary and updated version of the 
book of the same title published by the author in Bogotá in 
1985. 
I 
Youth and development 
From the sociological standpoint, youth is seen 
as a variable phenomenon which can exist, not 
exist, or take different forms, as if it was a 
society, or different aspects of the same society, 
or different groups within a society at a given 
moment. Youth is a cultural concept of historical 
origin which can have a high and a low point. In 
the case of Colombia, the concept of youth is of 
fairly recent origin, concurrent with other 
concepts related to the form of urban industrial 
development, such as "modernization" or "social 
mobility", "urbanism", "marginality", "enter-
prise" or "entrepreneur". All these concepts had 
the same historical genesis and have developed 
along similar lines, although with their own 
peculiar characteristics. 
The concept of youth derived from the urban 
industrial model of development is based on a 
transformation of the existing relationships 
between the family and work as they affect the 
process of socialization. This transformation is 
produced when socialization is entrusted to an 
education system conceived as a means of 
training manpower for the new model of urban 
life, for jobs which require a certain degree of 
specialized secondary qualifications, or for 
higher posts requiring university qualifications. 
In the years immediately preceding the 
institution of the modernization model, 
education was restricted to a very small group, 
and even primary education was extremely 
limited: for example, in 1940 in Colombia there 
were only 2 990 university students; in 1980 
180 000 students graduated from higher 
education. 
Before the adoption of the modernization 
model, the relationship between the family and 
work was virtually direct for the majority of 
Colombians: people worked in the family or 
moved on from the family to work without 
intermediate stages. This meant that youth, if it 
existed, was very short and only very small 
groups enjoyed an extensive and significant 
intermediate period. This situation changed 
with the expansion of education and the 
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programmes of educational democratization. 
However, the expansion of schooling and the 
consequent redistribution of youth did not affect 
all the groups equally: for most of the peasant 
groups youth could end at the age of 10, when the 
child moved on from the family and few years of 
school to work, but for urban middle- and upper-
class groups youth could easily last until the age 
of 20 or 25. 
These changes are associated both with the 
rapid expansion of the modernization model and 
with its short duration (about two and a half 
decades), as well as with ¡ts early decline. 
Colombia's modernization process has been 
extremely rapid, and although it has begun to 
lose momentum very quickly, it has produced 
very significant changes and a state of confusion 
about a suddenly uncertain future. It must be 
remembered that Colombia, a rural society 
organized on the basis of the low-productivity 
farm, with an embryonic manufacturing 
industry, with 71% of its population living in 
rural areas and with 87% in towns of less than 
200 000 inhabitants in 1938, switched to an 
urban economy with a high proportion of 
tertiary employment and 61% of its population 
living in towns in 1973, while the number of 
inhabitants tripled in those 35 years: from 8.7 to 
25.5 million. 
Apart from the problems of the differential 
distribution of young people among groups, 
especially between peasants or rural inhabitants, 
urban marginal and urban middle and upper 
classes, from the 1970s there has been a general 
abrupt devaluation of the concept of youth as the 
modernization model begins to run down. At the 
same time, the family, especially the peasant and 
marginal urban family but also the integrated 
urban family, has lost much of its capacity to 
provide social training for the new generations, 
and the world of work is finding it difficult to 
provide jobs for young people. Education, 
meanwhile, has been eroded as a bridge between 
family and work; it has become stratified, 
differentiated and devalued and its standards 
have been lowered, and to some extent it is 
having a marginalizing effect. 
This is taking place against the background 
of a failure to find a new model of society and 
development to replace or re-invigorate the 
urban industrial model. No clear tendency or 
way forward can be discerned, either for the 
social institutions which deal more directly with 
youth, such as family, school and work, or for 
society as a whole. These factors help to deny 
youth a future and make it difficult to think in 
terms of a realistic plan or of an "attainable 
utopia". 
A number of circumstances have converged 
to create this situation, and its understanding 
requires a brief account of its component 
elements. The first point to be made, of course, 
concerns the speed of the modernization 
process, which began in the 1950s in a rural 
society and transformed it in less than three 
decades into a basically urban and industrial 
society. However, the very speed of the process 
prevented it from settling down and produced a 
diversity of cultures and differences of regional 
development co-existing together and forming a 
network of inequalities, especially with respect 
to the transition from personal experience of the 
world as a community, typical of rural society, to 
the idea of nationhood and to an understanding 
of man in the international context. 
Subsequently, in the third decade of the process 
of industrial modernization, acute symptoms of 
its exhaustion began to appear, underlining the 
lack of a new model to take the place of the 
model which established modernization. 
The former process can be described in the 
following way, in terms of the different spheres 
of the social structure and of its most important 
consequences for today's youth in Colombia: 
a) Demographic change, expressed in high 
birth rates in past decades, resulted by the end of 
the 1970s and in the 1980s ¡n a large contingent 
of young people in the population. This 
happened at the very moment when the 
modernization model was beginning to run 
down and high rates of unemployment and 
underemployment were emerging. 
b) That moment also saw the convergence 
of a number of elements which can be described 
as an acute in ter-genera tio nal crisis, especially 
with respect to the family's role as a social 
conditioner of young people. This crisis or 
decline in contact and in the transmission of the 
cultural foundations of society from one 
generation to another was influenced by the 
following factors: the difference in education 
which made the parents less able to give the 
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children guidance in their school work and help 
them to understand social phenomena, a 
capacity which is concerned with the habits of 
analysis and the handling of the information 
furnished by the school system; the impaired 
capacity of the parents to understand the urban 
and cosmopolitan world of modernized 
Colombian society, due to their rural or semi-
rural roots and their children's greater 
experience of urban life; the decline in the 
prestige attached to the parents' occupations, or 
its complete disappearance in a largely urban 
economy; the inter-generational conflict of 
values concerning the prestige of the new 
occupations; the lower level of social training of 
young people by their parents, especially in the 
low and marginal strata, owing to the fact that 
the wives go out to work, and the consequent loss 
of contact between parents and children; the 
emergence of new forms of family organization 
in the young generation which is beginning to 
marry, and the value conflicts which these new 
forms generate both between generations and 
between the sexes, owing to the collision 
between the survival of attitudes to the marriage 
relationship rooted in rural or pre-modern 
society and the economic requirements or needs 
of a married couple living in an urban society in 
which the modernization model is beginning to 
run down. (In this connection, it must be pointed 
out that organizational adaptations of family life 
or cohabitation are emerging, somewhat in the 
form of clans, and are helping to create new 
forms of solidarity.) 
c) The pre-modernization forms of 
membership of political parties have been 
replaced, as a result of opposition generated 
largely by the National Front, by a clientelistic 
form of organization linked with the expansion 
of the economic power of the State and the 
bureaucracy. The majority of the population, 
especially the young population, has ceased to 
participate at all in the political process and has a 
feeling of impotence and disinvolvement in 
political matters. This situation has been 
brought about by the lack of modern political 
parties to encourage participation on the basis of 
programmes for society. Appeals for them to 
join a party do not impress young people who 
have not grown up in that habit, and the 
country's political life has been ruptured, with 
the party apparatuses operating in ways which 
have no real attraction for young people and very 
little connection with the realities of the 
country's situation. 
d) The expansion of the school system, 
which during the modernization process meant 
extending education beyond the élites, also led to 
the exclusion of a large part of the population, 
further weakening the position of those at the 
bottom of the ladder in a modern urban world. 
At the same time, as the modernization model 
began to run down, there was an accentuation of 
the stratification of educational institutions and 
programmes or curricula, which also meant 
discrimination against those not studying in 
"suitable" institutions or programmes. The 
concept of social mobility was struck a heavy 
blow by the modernization crisis, which eroded 
the relationship between education and work 
and between education and income. This 
situation can be seen very clearly in the 
programmes of secondary technical education 
and in some higher-education programmes. The 
point is that the policy of educational 
diversification is no longer consistent with the 
development model, or rather that it is moving 
into crisis in conjunction with the exhaustion of 
the modernization model. The same thing is 
happening with the education policies based on 
theories of human resources or human capital. 
The relationship between education and work is 
weakening and becoming a source of frustrated 
aspirations. 
On the other hand, as education has become 
universal, its quality has deteriorated, and 
education policies of the modern pedagogical 
type have been replaced in practice by the drive 
for policies that produce jobs, with harmful 
consequences for the quality of education. 
Instead of a person who participates, criticizes 
and creates, the system is forming a person with 
an authoritarian concept of society. Young 
people are being educated to perform certain 
specific tasks and not to be able to understand a 
social, scientific or humanistic whole. The 
teaching relationship, conditioned by the need to 
create jobs, is producing a dogmatic view of 
knowledge and impeding the development of a 
scientific outlook. But, above all, education in 
Colombia is now out of touch with the country's 
new situation. In view of the increase in 
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unemployment and underemployment among 
educated people, the most important function 
which the expansion of education or increase in 
the number of years of schooling is beginning to 
perform is to hold a large proportion of the 
young population back from the work market for 
a longer time. 
e) State services or private initiatives are 
very limited in terms of medical assistance for 
An analysis will be made of four aspects of the 
connection of youth with the world of work: the 
proportion of young people in the economically 
active population, the distribution of employed 
persons by economic sector, youth 
unemployment, and the relationship between 
education and unemployment. 
1. Young people in the economically 
active population 
At the beginning of the 1970s the proportion of 
young people in the economically active 
population (EAP) was 28.4%; at the mid-point 
of the decade it was 36%; and in 1980 it was 
40.7% (DANE, 1981). 
The differences in the proportion of young 
people in the EAP, i.e., in the urban and rural and 
male and female EAP, are extremely interesting: 
there are more women than men in both 1971 
and 1981 and in both the urban and the rural 
EAP. Furthermore, the proportion of young 
people in the urban EAP was greater at both 
dates, with the exception of the number of men 
in 1971, which was lower than the number of 
men in the rural EAP. The upward trend in the 
proportion of young people in the EAP, 
especially the urban EAP, is also well-
documented; the rural EAP remains practically 
the same, especially in the case of women. 
The general trend, therefore, is for the 
proportion of young people in the EAP, 
specifically the urban EAP, to increase, since, as 
young people, leisure programmes or organized 
activities which encourage solidarity and a 
feeling of belonging. 
Three aspects of the situation of Colombian 
youth, showing both its relationship to the 
missing future and the forms of its participation 
and exclusion, will now be described: work, 
political participation and migration. 
has been pointed out, their share in the rural EAP 
tends to remain static. The educational 
characteristics of the EAP for 1980 also illustrate 
the enormous differences between town and 
countryside. In the rural areas 62.1 % of the total 
EAP has primary education, 9.1 % secondary, and 
0.3% university, whereas the education levels of 
the urban EAP are 42.9% with primary, 39.4% 
with secondary and 13-5% with university 
education. These proportions also apply to the 
young EAP, although in the towns there is a 
higher proportion of young people with 
secondary education (48.3%). 
The employment rates of active young 
people are considerably lower than the national 
rates and lower still in the rural sector. In 1980 
employment in urban and rural areas tends 
towards parity, with the exception of the 
employment of young people aged 15 to 19, 
which declines between the two dates in town 
and countryside, but still with lower 
participation in the towns. The urban statistics 
available for the country's seven main towns 
may be overestimating the youth employment 
rates, for they do not include large groups of 
young people in small towns and in some 
provincial capitals, where one of the main 
problems is unemployment. 
The wage levels of young people with jobs in 
1980 show that 37% received less than the 
minimum wage, 32% the minimum wage, and 
31% more than the minimum. The high 
proportion of young people with wages below 
II 
Youth and the world of work 
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the legal minimum is due to the large number of 
minors in the work market and to their 
comparatively low education levels, which limit 
their access to higher rates of pay. 
With respect to the definition of youth, 
either as an age group or as a period of life 
occurring between family and school training 
and entry into the adult world (taking this to 
mean the world of work), a distinction can be 
made between rural youth and urban youth, in 
terms of their different forms of involvement in 
the work market. The structural heterogeneity 
characteristic of the country's economic 
development has produced discrimination in 
access to basic services, especially education, 
which affects young people in large groups of the 
population. This discrimination takes the form 
of enormous differences in the number of years 
of schooling, which works to the detriment of 
rural and marginal groups in particular, for they 
have to enter the world of work at an early stage 
in order to help solve the problems of the 
survival of their families, threatened as they are 
by the low level of incomes. The young EAP must 
therefore be described as part of the working-age 
population in every youth age group from the 
age of 12. In 1971 48.3% of the rural working-
age population was included in the active 
population. The individual rates for the young 
population were 20.2% for those aged 12 to 14, 
42.2% for the 15-19 group, and 54.8% for those 
aged 20 to 24. The differences between the sexes 
were also considerable, with a larger proportion 
of men in the 12-24 age group. The urban areas 
had a similar proportion of young people in the 
EAP, but the differences between the age groups, 
especially in those under 19, illustrate the 
profound inequality in the socio-economic 
structure between town and countryside. 
Given the enormous expansion of the 
education system in recent decades, it might 
have been expected that there would be a 
sizeable reduction in the young population in the 
workforce. In 1980, however, although the 
specific proportions of young people in the EAP 
declined for urban areas, rural youth increased its 
share in the 15-24 group and saw its share 
decline only in the 12-14 group, from 20.2% in 
1971 to 17.9% in 1981. The number of people 
aged 10 to 12 in the labour force, not identified in 
the 1971 survey, amounted to 8% in 1981. 
These figures clearly show the gradual 
deterioration in living standards, especially in 
urban areas, and the internal inefficiency of the 
education system. The data on the inactive 
population underline the magnitude of the loss 
of youth as a period of life. The proportions of 
young people in the category of students or 
household workers by age group are as follows: 
12-14: 94.4% students, 1.5% household 
workers; 15-19: 81.7% students, 10.3% 
household workers; 20-29: 31.2% students, 
58.1% household workers. 
2. Youth employment by production sector 
Comparison of the employment structures by 
sector of activity between 1971 and 1980 for the 
15-29 and over-40 age groups in rural and urban 
areas produces the following conclusions: 
a) The fundamental trend is not a greater 
differentiation but a greater similarity between 
the jobs held by young people and those held by 
the generation of the "parents". In 1971 there 
were several notable differences which had 
tended to disappear by 1980. In 1971 the 
difference between young people and adults 
engaged in agricultural work in the employment 
structure of the towns was 12.8%; in 1980 it was 
only 1.4%, with the adults predominating in 
both cases. Urban growth has meant that 
employment in the towns is becoming more 
urban and less rural in nature. On the other 
hand, the difference between the age groups, 
which had been 7.3 % in favour of the parents in 
the trade sector in 1971, was only 2.3% in 1980; 
in the services sector, where the difference had 
been 12.6% in favour of youth in 1971, it was 
only 3.2% in 1980. The differences in the other 
sectors remain practically the same or show only 
very small changes. All this seems to indicate 
that the differences in employment by sector 
found in the 1970s were connected with the 
period of transition in which the large groups of 
young people produced by the "population 
explosion" began to appear on the scene and 
take their places, in that period of modernizing 
development, in sectors capable of generating 
jobs particularly suitable for young people on the 
lowest rungs of the ladder or in certain areas of 
the informal economy. In this case, it is 
particularly clear that the agriculture sector 
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drives out young people and the services sector 
draws them in. Subsequently, with the change in 
the situation of demographic transition, and 
particularly with the exhaustion of the 
modernization model of development, these 
differences in the work sectors between young 
people and adults diminish almost to the 
vanishing point. This seems to suggest that the 
creation of jobs for young people in specific 
sectors, as happened in other Latin American 
societies {Durston and Rosenbluth, 1983), is a 
phenomenon which belongs to the specific point 
of development and subsequently disappears; in 
Colombia's case, this phenomenon occurred 
between the 1960s and the 1970s and the move 
towards homogeneity has already begun. 
However, another dimension of the 
evolution of employment in Colombia in the 
past decade must be born in mind: the growth of 
the informal urban sector. According to data 
from the National Planning Department (DNP), 
the informal urban sector accounts for 45.6% of 
the employed population, including workers in 
industrial undertakings with fewer than 10 
workers, own-account workers, unpaid family 
helpers, and domestic service. 
The growth in the economically active 
population is not absorbed by the modern sector 
of the economy; consequently, the informal 
sector becomes the alternative for the 
unsatisfied demand for employment in the 
modern sector, and it tends to increase as a result 
of the crisis in that sector. The DNP figures 
indicate that 43.7% of the employment 
generated in the country's towns between 1974 
and 1978 was in the informal sector. The fact 
that the greatest incidence of informal 
employment is found in services must cast a 
doubt on the enormous importance attributed, as 
a modernizing influence, to the phenomena of 
tertiarization which emerged with the urban 
industrial model In fact, side by side with a 
modern tertiary sector represented by the State 
and the financial institutions and employing 
more adults than young people, there co-exists a 
traditional tertiary sector, better described as 
underemployment, which at present absorbs the 
greater part of the population which does not 
obtain formal employment. Proof of this is 
provided by the increase in the number of young 
people in the employment category of own-
account workers between 1971 and 1980, from 
8.9 to 14.3%. 
b) With respect to the rural employment 
structure in 1971 (no comparable information is 
available for 1980), the differences between ages 
or generations are less than in the towns, and the 
only ones worth mentioning are a difference of 
5.2% in agricultural or primary employment in 
favour of adults, and of 4.3% in services in 
favour of young people. This seems to suggest 
that the intersectoral changes were much 
sharper in the towns than in the countryside; 
this is logical in view of the nature of 
modernizing development. However, this 
conclusion would have to be checked against the 
1980 rural employment structure. 
3. Youth unemployment 
The rates of youth unemployment are always 
higher than the adult ones, and the differences 
between the national rates and those of the 
youth groups almost double between 1971 and 
1980. On the other hand, a comparison of the 
specific national unemployment rates for town 
and countryside and by sex gives the following 
results: a) the urban youth rates are double the 
urban national rates for men; b) the rates for 
young urban women are higher than the totals 
for urban women, but the gap is smaller than for 
men; c) the rural youth unemployment rates 
(men and women) are higher than those for 
rural adults and they also tend towards double 
the total national youth rates; d) urban youth 
unemployment was very high in 1971 (17.7 and 
18.1% for men and women respectively) and it 
declined slightly in 1980 to 13.2 and 16.9%. 
Rural youth unemployment, in contrast, has 
increased, and although the male rate is 
relatively low (3.6 and 5-1% in 1971 and 1980), 
the female rate is extremely high (18.1 and 
24.1% for those two years). 
The underemployment rates are also higher 
for young people than for the population as a 
whole, especially for men; young women follow 
the trend of the total female population. Young 
men have rates of 21.4% for the 15-19 age group 
and 20.2% for the 20-29 group, whereas the rate 
for the population as a whole is 17.3%. The 
same trends are found for both visible and 
invisible underemployment. 
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A comparison of the evolution of the 
unemployment structure among young people 
and adults indicates very clear trends. In 1976 the 
12-29 age group accounted for 75.8% of total 
unemployment in the country; in 1980 that 
proportion had increased to 81.2%. Adult 
employment increased in the same period, 
indicating the difficulty which young people 
have in finding work, for the new jobs are almost 
always filled by adults. In addition, the low rates 
of pay disappoint the expectations created by 
education, with the result that large groups of 
young people abandon the structure of formal 
employment and try to find other kinds of work. 
In 1980 80.2% of the high rate of 
underemployment (15.4%) is due to low 
incomes and 11.6% to underutilization. The 
young population also spends the highest 
average amounts of time seeking work. In 1980 
42.7% of unemployed persons aged 15 to 19and 
37.6% aged 20 to 29 spent more than four 
months seeking work. 
4. Education and unemployment 
The relationship between more education, 
better jobs and higher pay postulated by the 
modernization model of development has lost 
much of its force in Colombia. The expansion of 
education and the crisis in industry have brought 
about a number of changes in the social 
significance of education. Although the sectors 
which plan education still see it primarily in 
terms of human capital and economic 
productivity, and as a guarantee of a job, 
everything seems to indicate that this economic 
function of education was peculiar to a specific 
point in development through modernization 
and that its direction is beginning to change. 
In 1964, the high point in the development 
of the urban industrial model, the positive 
relationship between education level and job was 
very clear. The higher unemployment rate 
affected mainly the illiterate population 
(23.7%); the population with secondary 
education had a rate of 13.5% and university 
graduates one of 10.8%. However, a study on 
employment and university education carried 
out in the National Association of Financial 
Institutes (ANIF) indicates that between 1976 
and 1978 the r e l a t ionsh ip between 
unemployment and education level did not 
follow the same trend. On the contrary, the 
lowest unemployment rates were found among 
people with no education at all or only primary 
education (5.2 and 7.9% respectively). In second 
place were those who had university or other 
higher education (8.3 and 9.5%), while the 
highest unemployment rates were found 
amongst those with academic secondary 
education (12.6%) and technical secondary 
education (21.0%). The high rate of 
unemployment among specialist technicians is 
particularly noteworthy as an indicator of the 
exhaustion of the urban industrial model 
(Chiappe and Toro, 1978). 
The low rate of unemployment among 
professionals in recent years conceals a growing 
problem of underemployment affecting mainly 
professionals from the low and middle strata 
educated at universities other than the élite ones. 
The main features of profess ional 
underemployment are a shift to branches of 
activity other than the one in which the person is 
qualified, movement within the occupational 
category itself, and an increase in temporary 
work, especially in community, social and 
personal services. 
In 1980 the unemployment rates were 
higher in the towns and much higher for women 
than for men. The highest rates were still found 
among persons with secondary education. The 
1981-1983 figures show remarkable differences 
in the unemployment rates for different towns. 
The unemployment rates for persons with 
higher education, 11.3% of the overall total and 
14.7% in the case of women, can be considered 
very high. 
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III 
Political participation 
Political participation is one of the areas in 
which it can be seen with greatest clarity that the 
concept of youth, accepted and extolled in 
theory, lacks real meaning in practice. The first 
indicator of this is the almost total lack of studies 
on political life among young people, on their 
participation, their leadership, their values and 
attitudes, and the lack of programmes to ensure 
their involvement in the country's political life. 
We will now discuss, on the basis of partial 
information from various general studies on 
politics, three central aspects of the political life 
of Colombian youth: a) their voting; b) their 
membership of political parties, and c) their 
political education. 
All the electoral studies carried out in the 
country affirm that abstention from voting by 
young people is very widespread and much 
greater, moreover, than among adults. For 
example, in the 1968 elections in Cali abstention 
by young people aged 21 to 25 amounted to 74% 
(McCamat and others, 1968). This same trend 
can be seen in Bogotá in the 1972 and 1974 
elections (Losada and Murillo, 1973; Murillo and 
Williams, 1975; Losada and Williams, 1972). In 
1978 the national abstention rate among young 
people aged 18 to 20 was 75% and in 1980 82% 
of young people aged 18 to 24 did not vote 
(Losada, 1981). A study carried out by the ANIF 
Social Group tried to establish the causes of this 
behaviour and it was found that only 19-3% of 
young people aged 18 to 24 abstained because 
they rejected the social system; 50.3% did so out 
of indifference to politics. At the same time, 
40% of young people said that the country's 
problems were purely political, while 68.3% 
showed profound ignorance of the local and 
national organization of politics (ANIF, 1981). 
Another piece of research carried out by the 
Department of Political Science of the 
University of the Andes shows that young 
people have a poor image of the country's 
political institutions. In fact, only 2.5% thought 
that election results represented the opinion of 
the majority of the electorate, while 89.1 % gave 
a negative opinion of members of parliament, 
using such terms as "dishonest", "inefficient" 
and "unproductive" (Latorre and Murillo, 1982). 
Women's participation in politics, according 
to a study by Patricia Pinzón de Lewin of 
electoral data for the period 1958-1974 indicates 
the following conclusions: women take part in 
politics less than men; they vote less often, 
participate less in political or party 
organizations, and their involvement tends to be 
greater among adults and women of the top 
social class. This phenomenon appears to be 
very similar for both sexes, but it affects women 
much more (Pinzón de Lewin and 
Rothlisberger, 1977). Some figures may give a 
clearer idea of this: in the 1974 elections the total 
rate of male abstention was 24.3% and female 
45.7%, whereas in the case of women aged 21 to 
24 abstention amounted to 67%, a proportion 
which declines with age to a level of 31% for 
women aged 45 to 49. 
On the other hand, membership of or 
identification with a political party follow clear 
lines when age is compared with the nature of 
the party: 44.8% of young people aged 18 to 24 
say they belong to one of the traditional 
Colombian political parties (liberal and 
conservative), whereas 82.2% of persons aged 
45 to 64 say this. Of persons aged 18 to 24 4.3% 
identify with opposition parties, and 1.9% do 
this in the 45-54 age group. However, the really 
significant thing is the high proportion of young 
people (48.8%) who do not identify with any 
party; in contrast, only 15.5% of the adult group 
(45 to 64) do not claim to belong to a party 
(ANIF, 1981). According to this same study, 
young people aged 18 to 24 take almost no part 
in associations of various kinds, devote little 
time to radio, television and newspapers, and 
even less time, in these media, to news or other 
programmes that may be considered political. 
In a study carried out among university 
students, 22% claimed no party identification, 
and 90% took no part in any grouping or party. 
These figures are very significant when it is 
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remembered that among Colombian young 
people the university is the place which has most 
fostered political partiipation of various kinds, 
especially among the groups of the Left. We thus 
have a picture in which young people do not 
believe in and do not take part in the traditional 
political parties ¡and where there are no other 
political groupings, party or otherwise, to fill 
this gap. There is also a very high level of 
ignorance about the national political system on 
the part of young people (Latorre and Murillo, 
1982). 
The voting behaviour of young people is, 
however, only an expression of formal 
participation in the country's democratic life. 
Their marked abstentionism, their lack of 
interest and their ignorance of the national 
political system have more profound causes 
rooted in social phenomena of the greatest 
importance for the definition of the role of youth 
and for the consideration of youth in terms of an 
integrated or marginal human group in 
Colombian life. We will now discuss briefly some 
of the most important factors affecting the 
political participation of young people. 
a) The changes in the family, which occurred 
in conjunction with industrialization and with 
the heavy waves of migration from the 
countryside to the town and between regions, 
have produced effects of rootlessness and loss of 
party-political identification traditionally linked 
with ecological bases and family traditions. The 
generation gap between the parents, who 
experienced the effervescent effects of the social 
model based on industrialization and 
urbanization of the economy, and the children, 
who are now growing up in a situation in which 
there is no clear model or national social 
objective, manifests itself clearly in the lack of 
interest shown by the new generations in the 
traditional political modes. A number of studies 
demonstrate this: university students, 90% of 
whom are not active in any party, say that 87% 
of their parents do belong to the traditional 
liberal and conservative parties (Latorre and 
Murillo, 1982). On the other hand, the study on 
the political participation of women mentioned 
above shows that abstention among women 
heads of households (42%) and wives (45%) is 
lower than among daughters (51%) or other 
female relatives in the family (54%) (Pinzón de 
Lewin and Rothlisberger, 1977). Although the 
family background might encourage, as has 
traditionally been the case in Colombia, a pattern 
of voting and political identification, the changes 
which the family has undergone during the 
country's historical development have created a 
very significant generation gap in the political 
participation of parents and children. The family 
has lost much of its capacity to provide education 
in political life and transmit a concept of society 
acceptable to the new generations. 
b) At least one study shows that there is no 
association between education and exercise of 
the right to vote (Pinzón de Lewin and 
Rothlisberger, 1977). This fact throws much 
light on the nature of education. The political 
education imparted by the school, it would seem, 
does not lead to participation on election days. It 
is very possible that the authoritarian nature of 
the social and teaching relationships in the 
classroom and the institutional government of 
the schools generate apathy and scepticism 
about society and the real possibilities of action 
within it. It is also very probable that the notion 
of society transmitted through the subject-
matter of social sciences fosters political apathy 
because it is out of touch with the realities of the 
students' lives. This certainly emerges more 
clearly with respect to the teaching of history in 
terms of heroic figures, whose value system and 
world view have little to do with the problems of 
young people in contemporary society. 
Even the university student movements 
which were all the rage in the 1960s and the first 
part of the 1970s, now do little more than form 
small parties of the Left of no attraction for 
young people, or groups which take the guerilla 
route. In general terms, great political apathy 
has developed among university students (Leal, 
1982). 
c) The traditional political parties have not 
formulated stable and durable programmes for 
youth, although they do assert the importance of 
this population group, especially at election 
time. Some parties of the Left have devised this 
kind of programme, but as they have little access 
to the machinery of the State, these programmes 
remain little more than proseletyzing 
exhortations. Account must also be taken of the 
de-politicizing effect of the National Front, one 
of whose political goals was to reduce the 
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acrimonious political atmosphere surrounding 
the traditional parties which had led to violence 
(Guzman and others, 1962). The Colombian 
political parties are only organized to any great 
extent at election time and they do not offer a 
permanent sphere of action in which young 
people can take part, develop as leaders and 
involve themselves in a more organized manner. 
In other democracies the political parties are the 
prime exponents of the function of political-
education institutions, but this is not the case in 
Colombia, and young people do not have a very 
clear idea of what their role in a political party 
might be, not only with respect to a concept of 
power within society and the formulation of 
plans and programmes which define a clear and 
attractive party line, but also with respect to 
Several analysts have described migration in 
Colombia as a form of economic exile (Cardona 
and others, 1980). In order to clarify the true 
meaning of this notion of economic exile, 
distinctions have to be made between three types 
of migration. Internal migration, firstly, is 
basically population movements among regions 
and from the countryside to the town. It reflects 
the very frequent changes in the country's 
development poles and it cannot strictly be 
termed exile if migration caused by violence in 
its various forms is excluded. A second type is 
migration to neighbouring countries, especially 
Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama, where larger 
and better-paid work markets have at times 
existed. This kind of migration has many 
seasonal aspects and does, in any event, imply a 
return to Colombia. A third type of migration 
has traditionally occurred to the United States 
and it is of a more permanent nature. 
It is of interest in this study to examine the 
two types of migration to foreign countries, for 
they act as an escape valve for employment 
problems and, in some cases, they represent a 
search for broader cultural horizons. Colombia 
their involvement in the parties, apart from 
their temporary role as agitators at election time. 
The low level of participation of Colombian 
youth in politics seems to be determined by two 
types of factor and their interrelationship. The 
first is the lack of a national goal, of a purpose 
investing the action of the Statç and the political 
parties with meaning and within which young 
people can see themselves as an integral part; 
and the lack of a plan to define the direction in 
which society is headed, similar to the concept of 
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , u r b a n i z a t i o n and 
modernization in the 1950s and 1960s. The 
second factor is the consequent loss of 
educational power by the social institutions 
which exist for this purpose, such as the family, 
the school and the political party. 
has not always been an exporter of population; 
on the contrary, 30 years ago people migrated to 
Colombia from Venezuela and Ecuador. Today 
this process has undergone a dramatic reversal, 
and only the crisis in the oil economies of 
Venezuela and Ecuador has produced any 
reduction in the numbers of migrants. 
Contrary to what might be thought, it is not 
unemployed Colombians who migrate to 
Venezuela, but manual workers, day labourers 
and low-income white-collar workers, mostly 
young people under 30. As many as 75% of the 
migrants were born into urban families or had 
migrated much earlier to the big towns. Fourty 
per cent of them have completed primary 
education, 10% are illiterate and 50% have 
secondary education. Of the latter, 40% have 
Studied in the National Apprenticeship Service 
(SENA), an official institute for the training of 
skilled manual workers. This indicates that there 
has been abundant migration of young people to 
Venezuela and that at least two big groups can be 
identified in this migratory flow. The first is 
made up of typical urban-marginal young 
people, possibly from families which have 
IV 
Migration 
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migrated from the countryside to the town, very 
possibly with incomplete primary education or 
illiterate; they are the most exploited people in 
Venezuela, especially in farm work or in the less 
desirable jobs in the towns (Gómez and Diaz, 
1983). A second group of young people seems to 
migrate to Venezuela on better terms, having 
acquired greater work experience in Colombia, 
secondary education and, in at least half the 
cases, a decent level of specialized technical 
training. 
Perhaps the factor which best defines 
migration to neighbouring countries, which are 
also developing countries, as distinct from other 
forms of foreign migration by Colombians, is the 
strong likelihood of return. In other words, it is a 
question of temporary migration, for various 
lengths of time, depending on the nature of the 
employment in Venezuela, but with the great 
majority of the migrants returning to their place 
of origin. Moreover, the idea of return is an 
element which defines the project from its very 
conception. For it is not, generally speaking 
families which migrate, but individuals who, in 
80% of the cases, have a house with basic 
services in Colombia, periodically send part of 
their earnings home, and on their return bring 
with them small amounts of capital which they 
invest in the improvement of their homes, 
meeting their families' health and education 
deficits and setting up workshops or 
neighbourhood stores. 
Studies on migration of Colombians to 
Panama, Ecuador and, in particular, Venezuela 
indicate that migration to neighbouring 
countries acts as a means of cutting the Gordian 
knots of unemployment, underemployment and 
low wages formed by the type of development 
Colombia has experienced. In this sense, 
migration represents a temporary form of 
economic exile, used primarily by groups of 
marginal, manual and other workers whose 
family incomes are insufficient and have to be 
supplemented by surpluses from wages earned 
in stronger currencies abroad. 
Juvenile work in the domestic market has 
been the mechanism for making good the 
shortfall in wages for the maintenance of the 
labour force, and migration to neighbouring 
countries is another form of youth employment; 
in a way, migration is also an example of how the 
age of youth is cut short among the bottom 
population groups. 
A decision to migrate on the part of a young 
Colombian is influenced by four factors related 
to the country's structural impoverishment: 
unemployment and underemployment, low 
wages, the need to supplement the family 
income to improve living standards, especially 
with respect to housing, health and education, 
and the need to enter the informal economy as a 
means of creating more stable mechanisms for 
producing income to maintain the standard of 
living. Joining the informal economy is 
necessarily an alternative not only for young 
people moving within the circle of 
unemployment and underemployment or of 
typically marginal occupations, but also for those 
such as skilled manual workers who have been 
trained to work at the heart of the economy, 
owing to the growing industrial unemployment 
and the low wages resulting from the industrial 
crisis. 
The migration of young people to work in 
neighbouring countries is therefore an example 
of the twofold way in which society marginalizes 
its youth: by obliging them to work during the 
period defined as youth, thus depriving them of 
the right to youth and, on the other hand and 
paradoxically, by denying them paid work and 
thus driving them into the ranks of adult 
structural marginality. 
Between 1951 and 1977 27.5% of the South 
Americans admitted as immigrants into the 
United States were Colombians. But this 
migration has not been constant over time; of all 
the immigrants into the United States since 
1936, between 1936 and 1945 only 1.3% were 
from Colombia, and between 1946 and 1955 the 
figure was 6%; but between 1956 and 1965 it 
was 34.7%, and in the following decade 58%. 
This means that between 1956 and 1977 92.7% 
of Colombian migrants were legal migrants to 
the United States. This of course does not take 
into account the rapid growth in illegal 
immigrants (Cardona, 1980). Of this migratory 
flow over the last two decades, 49% were young 
people aged 10 to 29. If the number of children 
under 10 is included, the total amounts to 68.4% 
of the migrants. 
The migration of Colombians to the United 
States is very different in kind from the 
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migration to neighbouring countries. Perhaps 
the main common denominators are the high 
proportion of young people and the fact that the 
migrants are seeking solutions to the economic 
and cultural problems facing them in their own 
country. The occupational and educational 
characteristics of the migrants are very different. 
Sixty-one per cent are under 14, housewives, 
students or retired persons. Among the 
migrants who work, the largest category is made 
up of professional and similar persons (8%), 
followed by craftsmen (6.9%), office workers 
(6.5 %), and skilled manual workers (6.2%). The 
smallest groups seem to be made up of the least 
qualified workers: domestic staff, service 
workers, sales persons, unskilled manual 
workers (Cardona, 1980). Some 14.5% of the 
immigrants into the United States have either 
complete or incomplete primary education; 
43.5% have complete or incomplete secondary 
schooling, 29-1% have studied at the university 
level, and 2.9% have pos tgradua te 
qualifications. On the other hand, the general 
trend is for families to migrate, rather than 
individuals, and for the notion of return to give 
rise to conflict; although return is desired and 
talked about, it is rarely achieved, and the 
migration usually becomes permanent. 
A distinction must be made between two 
types of migration of young people to the United 
Young people in Colombia will suffer the fate 
suffered by Colombian society in its future. Most 
of the circumstances described in this paper 
affect society as a whole and are not peculiar to 
youth, but they do form a framework outside of 
which the youth problem could not be 
understood. Attention must be drawn, however, 
to a general factor of prime importance which 
does directly affect young people and their 
integration in society and which can be worked 
at with the specific purpose of furnishing an 
effective tool for improving youth's capacity to 
States. The first wave was made up basically of 
professional people seeking better work 
opportunities and it was called the "brain drain". 
It usually consisted of non-marginal young 
people, and this situation was and remains the 
subject of a number of studies and plans for 
return sponsored by the Colombian 
Government. The second wave of migrants 
included, in addition to persons with university 
and technical qualifications, families and a large 
group of young people not educated to the same 
level as the first group. They include the illegal 
immigrants into the United States, with groups 
from the middle class, the lower-middle class 
and some of working-class extraction, but hardly 
marginal in their Colombian origins. Rather 
than marginality, the direct motives for 
migrat ion seem to be low wages, 
underemployment and the lack of opportunities 
for economic and cultural progress. Where the 
"brain drain" is concerned, attention must be 
drawn to the unemployment among 
professionals in Colombia caused by the 
limitations of the domestic work market. That 
might explain this marked characteristic of 
Colombian society, especially among health 
professionals (24.5%), engineers (13.3%), 
teachers (13.8%), technicians (17.6%), and 
auditors and accountants (9.5%) during the 
period from 1954 to 1976 (Cardona, 1980). 
participate and its role as agent and protagonist 
of social change: this is education. 
If present-day education in Colombia is to be 
thought of as a means of bringing about 
significant and beneficial changes, the following 
points, among others, must be taken into 
consideration: 
a) The clearest fact in the present 
relationship between education and society in 
Colombia is the lack of connection between the 
two. With modernization, education acquired 
and economic significance which it did not have 
V 
Youth and education 
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before, a connection with production and work 
and an identification with productivity, 
improvement of personal incomes and 
development. This was why so much importance 
was given to the economic part of education and 
to this social function and its planning. With the 
arrival of the crisis of the modernization model, 
however, education is beginning to lose a large 
part of its predominantly economic function. 
This fact must therefore be taken into account 
and a new assessment made of the other 
functions of education which, without 
disappearing during the peak period of 
modernization, had been relegated to the 
background. These functions include all those 
affecting quality, not in terms of school output 
but in terms of capacity to inculcate an 
understanding of the world, of society and of the 
individual. It is of greatest importance, with 
respect both to education planning and to the 
image which young and adult Colombians have 
of education, to balance the idea that education is 
a passport to work, high incomes and social 
mobility with the notion that it is a way of 
seeking knowledge to increase individual and 
social growth, and a means of increasing a 
person's knowledge of his own community and 
society so that he can participate in them more 
effectively and play a role in their government 
and in the form that government takes. 
b) All this means reconsidering the 
usefulness of continuing to define Colombian 
education in terms of extreme diversification at 
both secondary and higher levels, which in 
practical terms creates careers and specialities as 
a response to changes in demand. In this system, 
education has been transformed into an 
instrument in the service of demand and it has 
ended up by training "technologists" who are 
incapable of seeing things in the round. An 
extremely compartmentalized outlook has thus 
been created which sets the school and the world 
in opposition to each other, or at least has turned 
the school's back to the world. This essentially 
ulilitarian orientation has tended to produce 
dogmatic and authoritarian people with 
essentially partial and specialized knowledge; 
they are unaware of the many different and 
complementary forms of knowledge or of the 
insufficiency of any particular area of knowledge, 
and they are incapable of thinking scientifically. 
The point of this kind of education policy is to 
train people for a static society, for a model of 
society in which the most important changes are 
variations in the demand for a certain type of 
human resources. 
c) It is therefore useful to consider the 
possibilities of education focussed on the 
problems of quality and not on responses to the 
immediate needs in human resources. This 
means education for a changing society, for a 
model-less society, education which produces a 
person who can cope with any kind of future and 
not a person trained for only one kind of society, 
a person capable of thinking scientifically and 
not crushed under the weight of specific 
information which does not help him to 
understand the changing and surprising world 
around him, a person who can cope 
imaginatively with a society in crisis, who can 
function in a world of contradictory values, and 
not a person programmed to view life in only 
one way. In other words, a person who has been 
prepared to participate in a changing democratic 
society. 
d) This kind of person is not being produced 
by today's school system in Colombia —as a result 
of the policy of specialized education focussed on 
employment and of the social organization of 
school institutions. The present tendency in 
Colombia's schools is not to teach people to 
think but to store largely irrelevant information. 
They are not taught to relate theory to practice, 
to apply theories to the solution of the problems 
facing young people, or to create knowledge. The 
Colombian school tends to deaden rather than 
stimulate the imagination. It is thus generating 
low-grade cultural growth which then produces 
a low-grade democracy. 
Above all, however, the Colombian school is 
training people for a form of society and a 
specific type of development which are already 
in crisis; and this very fact exacerbates the crisis 
affecting young people and society itself, for 
education does not function as a useful and valid 
tool for coping with the future. In many cases, as 
this paper has shown, it does not even perform 
this function for the present. 
e) A change in education of the kind 
described necessarily implies social training: a 
special emphasis on ensuring that the students 
learn to study their society, to see it as it really is, 
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to criticize it and to participate in its future and 
in the moulding of its social characteristics. 
Education must be seen as a means of 
participation in democracy and in the country's 
political life and not as a factor of mar-
ginalization, exclusion and stratification. Such a 
change of outlook, together with a sharp 
improvement in quality and in the access to 
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